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Czechoslovak Diplomacy toward Lusatia, 1918-1919
At the 1919 Paris Peace conference, diplomats sketching the world’s new frontiers
considered assigning Lusatia to the new Czechoslovak Republic. Lusatia’s status is
no longer a topical issue, and indeed its location is not common knowledge even
among central European scholars. Lusatia lies in the far east of the contemporary
Federal Republic of Germany along the Polish border, and has since medieval times
been divided into Upper Lusatia (in Saxony) and Lower Lusatia (in contemporary
Brandenburg, formerly Prussia). At the 1815 Congress of Vienna, Upper Silesia was
further partitioned: the northern part went to Prussian Silesia while the southern
part remained in Saxony. No administrative unit called Lusatia exists today, though
memories of the historic region linger. Schemes for a Czechoslovak Lusatia illustrate
how historic claims and great power politics clashed with the idealistic national rhet-
oric that the First World War brought to European peacemaking. 
However improbable the idea of a Czechoslovak Lusatia may seem today, docu-
ments from 1918 and 1919 show that several influential Czech politicians desired a
Czechoslovak Lusatia, including Edvard Beneš and Karel Kramář, Czechoslovakia’s
two accredited representatives at the Peace Conference, and Czechoslovakia’s first
President, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, later remembered as the “president-liberator”
(prezident osvoboditel). The Serbski Narodny Wubjerk (Sorbian National Com-
mittee), which declared Sorbian independence in late 1918, also showed a certain
sympathy for Czech aspirations: its two main leaders, Arnošt Bart and Jan Bryl,
both had long-standing Czech contacts.
The little-studied history of prewar Czech-Sorbian cultural interaction fore-
shadowed postwar notions of Lusatio-Czecho-Slovak unity,1 but this paper seeks
primarily to explain why the Czechoslovak government, with Beneš as its spokes-
man, ultimately refrained from demanding Lusatia, despite pressure from Kramář,
the provisional Czechoslovak government in Prague, various popular organizations
in the Czech public sphere, and the Sorbian national council in Bautzen (Budyšin).
Historians, as a rule, devote more effort to explaining why historical actors took the
decisions they did, rather than explaining why they rejected the options they reject-
ed. Understanding how choices appeared to those who made them, however, re-
quires a vigorous exploration of counterfactual alternatives. Czech and Sorbian
activists openly petitioned for Czechoslovak annexation during the Peace Confe-
rence, including several figures in Beneš’s own entourage. Why did Beneš not?
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Czechoslovakia had a legal claim to Lusatia, but not a particularly compelling one.
Czechoslovakia claimed legal continuity with the historic Bohemian Crown Lands,
and Lusatia had belonged to those crown lands during the middle ages. John the
Blind of the Luxembourg dynasty acquired Upper Lusatia in 1319; in 1367, his son
Charles IV purchased Lower Lusatia from Brandenburg. Habsburg Emperor
Ferdinand II, however, ceded his claims to Lusatia at the Peace of Prague in 1635,
during the Thirty Years War.2 The peace treaty supposedly specified that the territo-
ries would revert to the Czech crown should the Saxon royal issue ever fail. The
abdication of German royal families, it was argued, caused Lusatia to revert to the
Czech crown.3
The numerous suppliants at the Peace conference, however, showered the Entente
with a welter of competing historic legal claims. In the heyday of what Erez Manela
eloquently dubbed the “Wilsonian moment,”4 successful petitioners had to bolster
legal arguments with appeals to nationality. American president Woodrow Wilson
had not, of course, single-handedly destroyed the monarchical principle, and indeed
Borislav Chernev usefully reminds us that in fact the Central Powers had already
introduced the principle of national self-determination to European diplomacy dur-
ing the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk.5 Nevertheless, the rhetoric of national
self-determination suffused the Paris Peace Conference. Wilson was the hero of the
hour, and political actors at the Paris Peace Conference routinely invoked his name
and the slogans associated with him. 
As it happens, Czechoslovak patriots could also deploy the rhetoric of national
self-determination to justify a Czechoslovak Lusatia. Lusatia is the homeland of a
partly-Catholic, partly-Lutheran people usually known in English as the Sorbs, but
also referred to as Wends, Lusatians, Lusatian Serbs, or, occasionally, Sorabs.6
Linguistically, the Sorbs are closely related to the Czechs, though the politics of
Sorbian ethno-linguistic classification has its controversies. Illustrious Slavists such
2 For a Sorbian perspective on Lusatia’s legal status, see Kapras, Jan: Prawne stawizny
Hornjeje a Delnjeje Łužicy za čas čěskeho knježeŕstwa [The Legal History of Upper and
Lower Lusatia in the Era of the Bohemian State]. Bautzen 1916.
3 Je samostatny serbski stat nuzny, móžny, woprawnjeny?/Ist ein selbständiger Wendenstaat
notwendig, möglich, berechtigt? (Bilingual document). Serbski Narodny Wubjerk, Serbski
kulturny archiw Budyšin [Serbian Cultural Archive, Bautzen], MS XIX-1/A, 10. Flier
number 18. – The Peace of Prague makes no mention of Lusatia, speaking instead only of
“what his Electoral Highness in Saxony occupies of the Kingdom of Bohemia and the
Dutchy of Silesia.” See Abdruck des Friedens-Schlusses von der Röm. Käys. Mayt. und
Churfl. Durchl. zu Sachssen etc zu Prag Auffgerichtet den 20/30 Maij Anno 1635. Dresden
1635, 18.
4 Manela, Erez: The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of
Anticolonial Nationalism. Oxford 2007.
5 Chernev, Borislav: The Brest-Litovsk Moment: Self-Determination Discourse in Eastern
Europe before Wilsonianism. In: Diplomacy and Statecraft 22 (2011) no. 3, 369-387.
6 This paper refers to “Sorbs.” See Siatkowska, Ewa: Serbowie, Wendowie, Łużyczanie
[Sorbs, Wends, Lusatians]. In: Studia Łużycoznawcze. Warsaw 2000, 316-324. – On
Sorbian ethnonyms in Anglophone diplomatic documents, see Barker, Peter: Wends, Serbs
or Sorbs? The British Foreign Office and the Sorbs of Lusatia (1942-47). In: German Life
and Letters 48 (1995) no. 3, 362-370, here 365, 369.
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as Aleksandr Pypin, Vladimir Spasovich,7 and Pavel Josef Šafařík,8 for example,
posited two Sorbian “dialects,” while the equally respected scholars Josef
Dobrovský9 and Lubor Niederle perceived two “separate Slavic languages.” 10 To-
day, two Sorbian literary traditions exist, Upper Sorbian (hornjoserbšćina) and
Lower Sorbian (dolnoserbšćina); scholars variously describe them as two closely
related languages,11 or as dialects or varieties of a single language.12 Czechoslovakia’s
ethnographic claim to Lusatia rested on the notion that Sorbs were closely related to
Czechs, and could therefore better enjoy national self-determination in Czecho-
slovakia than in non-Slavic Germany.
Even assuming ethnic sympathy between Sorbs and Czechs, however, the ethno-
graphic principle offered only equivocal support for Czechoslovak Lusatia. Lusatia’s
population remained predominantly German. During the Peace Conference, both
Sorbian and Czech patriots typically claimed a total Sorbian population of 200000,13
often attributing the figure to the ethnographic work of Sorbian savant Arnošt
Muka, but sometimes speaking merely of “Sorbian statistics.”14 Imperial Germany’s
1910 census, however, counted only 103000 Sorbs in Lusatia, with an additional
26576 in Silesia.15 German census figures are controversial, and some scholars be-
lieve that Germanizing census-takers may have undercounted by as much as 60000.16
7 Pypin, Aleksandr/Spasovich, Vladimir: Istoriya slavyanskikh literatur [History of Slavic
Literature]. Petersburg 1879, 19. – This influential work is also available in Czech transla-
tion by Antonín Kotík (Historie literatur slovanských, Praha 1880), in German translation
by Traugott Pech (Geschichte der slavischen Literaturen, Leipzig 1880), and in French
translation by Ernest Denis (Histoire des litteratures slaves, Paris 1881).
8 Šafařík, Pavel Josef: Slowanský Národopis [Slavic Ethnography]. Praha 1842, vol. 1, 5-6.
9 Dobrovský, Josef: Geschichte der Böhmischen Sprache und ältern Literatur. Prag 1819, 32-
33.
10 Niederle, Lubor: Slovanský Svět [The Slavic World]. Praha 1909, 70.
11 Sussex, Roland/Cubberley, Paul: The Slavic Languages. Cambridge 2006, 527. – Brozović,
Dalibor: Die sorbischen Sprachen – Varianten einer Standardsprache oder spezifische 
selbstständige Standardsprachen? In: Lětopis 33 (1986) 45-56.
12 Stone, Gerald: The Smallest Slavonic Nation: The Sorbs of Lusatia. London 1972, 104. –
Kaspar, Martin: Language and Culture of the Lusatian Sorbs throughout their History.
Berlin 1987, 52.
13 One article suggested both the figure “200000 souls” and “more than 160000.” Černý,
Adolphe: Question des Serbes des deux Lusace. In: La Nation Tchèque 4 (15 January-1
March 1919), nos. 14-17, 590-601, here 591 and 593. – See also Páta, Josef: Lužice [Lusatia].
Praha 1919, 48.
14 See e.g. Bart, Arnošt: Memorandum: The Principles of Autonomy of the Lusatian Slavs. In:
Scheuermann, Martin: Die Sorbenpolitik des Völkerbundes – ein bisher kaum bekanntes
Nebenkapitel europäischer Geschichte. In: Lětopis 43 (1996) 2, 33-54, here 45-46. – Re-
soluzija shromadźiszy ßerbskeje studowazeje młodźiny [Resolution at the Meeting of
Studying Sorbian Youth]. In: Serbske Nowiny 77 (28 December 1918) no. 52, 415. The 
latter resolution was also reported in the Czech press via the Czech news agency ČTK, see
Národní listy, večerní vydání (2 January 1919) 1.
15 Tschernik, Ernst: Die Entwicklung der sorbischen Bevölkerung von 1832 bis 1945: eine
demographische Untersuchung. Berlin 1954, 21. – Kamusella, Tomasz: Silesia and Central
European Nationalisms. The Emergence of National and Ethnic Groups in Prussian Silesia
and Austrian Silesia, 1848-1918. West Lafayette 2007, 173.
16 Belzyt, Leszek: Die Zahl der Sorben in der amtlichen Sprachenstatistik vor dem Ersten
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Yet while Sorbian speakers may have formed an absolute majority in a few districts,
they were not a majority in Lusatia as a whole.17 Most Sorbs, furthermore, were
bilingual,18 and many were nationally indifferent.19
Nevertheless, the weakness of ethnographic claims did not necessarily preclude
their persuasiveness or effectiveness at the Paris Peace Conference. The great pow-
ers gathered in Paris rarely let ethnographic niceties stand in the way of national or
imperial interests. Sorbian “liberation” from German rule offered the Great Powers
a pretext to weaken Germany. Czech nationalists had the ear of the Great Powers,
and they coveted Lusatia. 
No Czech more passionately desired a Czechoslovak Lusatia than ethnographer
and Slavist Adolf Černý. Černý first visited Lusatia in 1884, when he befriended
Muka; after traveling together the two scholars arranged a museum exhibition of
Sorbian folk costumes.20 They ultimately corresponded for 47 years.21 Černý had
taught the Sorbian language in Prague since 1901,22 and published several works on
Sorbian folk culture and literature.23 Černý ultimately contributed several literary
articles to the Sorbian monthly “Łužica”, including translations of Czech poetry. He
translated Sorbian literary works into Czech, and generally wrote widely on Sorbian
affairs.24 He also showed a certain capacity for organizational work: in the 1880s, he
helped found a Sorbian library in Bautzen,25 and in 1907, he founded the Společnost
přátel Lužice (Society of the Friends of Lusatia) in Prague, facilitating contact bet-
ween Sorbian university students and sympathetic Czechs.26
Weltkrieg. In: Kunze, Peter (ed.): Nationale Minderheiten und staatliche Minderheiten-
politik in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert. Berlin 1999, 157-169, here 158. – On Sorbian
population estimates, see Glaser, Konstanze: Minority Languages and Cultural Diversity 
in Europe. Gaelic And Sorbian Perspectives. Clevedon 1997 (Linguistic Diversity and
Language Rights), 101-03.
17 Belzyt: Die Zahl der Sorben, see Tables 1-2, pp. 159-60 (cf. fn. 16).
18 Glaser: Minority Languages and Cultural Diversity 105 (cf. fn. 16).
19 On national indifference, see Zahra, Tara: Imagined Noncommunities: National In-
difference as a Category of Analysis. In: Slavic Review 69 (Spring, 2010) no. 1, 93-119.
20 Nedo, Paul: Arnošt Mukas Beitrag zur sorbischen Volkskunde. In: Lětopis 22 (1975) 163-
173, here 166-167, 169.
21 Valenta, Zdeněk: Česká učast na výstavbě a vybavení Lužickosrbského domu v korespon-
denci mezi Adolfem Černým a Arnoštem Mukou [Czech Participation in Constructing and
Furnishing the Lusatian-Sorbian House in the Correspondence between Adolf Černý and
Arnošt Muka]. In: Marvan, Jiří (ed.): Praha a Lužičí Srbové [Prague and the Lusatian
Sorbs]. Praha 2005, 75-81, here 75.
22 Páta, Josef: Vznik a vývoj našeho spolku [The Origin and Evolution of Our Society]. In:
Páta, Josef/Zmeškal, Vladimir: Naše styky s Lužicí [Our Relations with Lusatia]. Praha
1934, 19-34, here 26.
23 Bahlcke, Joachim: Geschichte der Oberlausitz: Herrschaft, Gesellschaft und Kultur vom
Mittelalter bis zum Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts. Leipzig 2001, 39. – For Černý’s works, see
Cyž, Jan (ed.): Adolf Černý: Antologija jeho dźěłow [Adolf Černý: An Anthology of his
Works]. Bautzen 1958. 
24 For an overview of Černý’s Lusatian journalism, see Černý, Adolf: Růžné listy o Lužice
[Various Articles about Lusatia]. Praha 1894.
25 Slovanské Paběrky [Slavic Gleanings]. In: Lumír 17 (1 July 1889) no. 19, 228.
26 Páta, Josef/Zmeškal, Vladimír: Naše styky s Lužicí: jubilejní sborník [Our Relations with
Lusatia: Jubilee Anthology]. Praha 1934, 44, 57-58.
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Černý’s enthusiasm for the Lusatian Sorbs arose from broader Pan-Slav sympa-
thies. In 1899, Černý founded the journal “Slovansky přehled” (Slavonic Review)
during an upsurge in Pan-Slavic enthusiasm; its remit considered the whole of the
Slavic world, not just Lusatia. Depending on the political context, however, Černý
would prioritize specifically Czechoslovak ties over nebulous Slavism. In a 1906
article on “Slavic reciprocity in the present age,” for example, Černý criticized Slo-
vak Russophile tendencies, advocating “Czechoslovak unity” instead.27
On 13 October 1918, Adolf Černý propounded his vision of Czechoslovak
Lusatia in “Národní listy” (National Pages), in an article published next to portraits
of Masaryk and Wilson. Černý lamented Lusatia’s partition between Saxony and
Prussia, which had taken place “without anybody asking the Lusatian Serbs” and
“precipitated Germanization”. Victory over the Central Powers, however, would
right historic wrongs: “Today, in the twelfth hour,” he continued, “it is finally pos-
sible and even supremely necessary to speak firmly and clearly about the Lusatian
question” (emphasis in original). The Sorbs, Černý argued,
[...] are the closest to us of all the Slavic family, and still have certain constitutional connections
with the Czech crown. The Sorbian language is closer to ours than to Polish, and if they had
not been cut off from us [...] we would be even closer; indeed we might perhaps have reached
a common literary speech. Certainly their language is no further from ours than Slovene is
from Croatian, and would undoubtedly belong to our Czechoslovak language territory, if they
weren’t cut off from us by German territory.28
Černý noted that Wilson “spoke not only about the claims of great nations, but of
all nations, large, small, and smallest,” and alluded to a speech of 11 February in
which Wilson had declared: “national self-determination is not a mere phrase, but an
imperative principle of action”.29 The Sorbs also enjoyed the right to self-deter-
mination, and, Černý argued, wished to exercise that right by joining the new
Czechoslovak Republic.
In December 1918, Černý further described putative Sorbian aspirations in a full-
length book whose title, “Lužická otázka” (The Lusatian Question), evoked
Masaryk’s 1895 “Česká otázka” (The Czech Question).30 Černý summarized Lu-
satian history for the Czech public. He particularly emphasized the Sorbian struggle
against Germanization, thus linking Sorbian aspirations to those of Czech patriots.
He then ended with a personal note:
The foregoing was written before the collapse of Austria-Hungary, that is, during the age of
censorship. Today [...] we can decisively express the desire for the unification of Sorbian
Lusatia with the Czechoslovak state, since this is the only assurance of placing Lusatian
Sorbian national self-determination on a firm foundation.31
27 Černý, Adolf: K poměru československé [On Czechoslovak Relations]. In: Slovanský
přehled 6 (1903) 113-117, here 117.
28 Černý, Adolf: Lužice a mírový kongres [Lusatia and the Peace Congress]. In: Národní listy
58 (27 October 1918) no. 116, 1.
29 Ibid. 1. 
30 Meškank, Timo: Kultur besteht – Reich vergeht: Tschechen und Sorben (Wenden) 1914-
1945. Berlin 2000, 36.
31 Černý, Adolf: Lužická otázka [The Lusatian Question]. Plzeň 1918, 103.
Maxwell: Edvard Beneš and the Soft Sell 353
Černý’s final chapter showed his personal contacts with leading Sorbian politicians:
it described the acts of his friend Arnošt Bart since the November armistice, includ-
ing his as-yet unpublished declaration of Sorbian independence.32
Černý’s tireless efforts to promote Czecho-Sorbian reciprocity bore fruit after the
Entente victory, when several of his former students also agitated for a Czechoslovak
Lusatia. In 1907, a mixed group of Czech and Sorbian students had founded a
Czecho-Lusatian Society now known as the Společnost přátel Lužice (Society of the
Friends of Lusatia), but originally founded as the Česko-lužický spolek „Adolf
Černý“ (The Czecho-Lusatian Society “Adolf Černý”), and hereafter referred to as
the Czecho-Lusatian Society. Its founding members included Bryl, who later
became a prominent figure in the Serbski Narodny Wubjerk, and the Czech Slavist
Josef Páta, chairman of the Czecho-Lusatian Society during the peace negotiations
and on into the First Czechoslovak Republic.
In 1919, the Czecho-Lusatian Society organized a series of lectures, concerts, and
similar public events. Páta later recalled that “our meetings and lectures filled the
greatest meeting halls in Prague and in the Czechoslovak countryside.” 33 Some
events attracted prominent guests. For example, President Masaryk and Agrarian
leader Antonín Švehla, then interior minister, attended a concert in the Smetana Hall
of Prague’s Obecní dům (Civic House). Smetana Hall was not only the largest con-
cert venue in Prague, but had hosted the Czech declaration of independence just a
few months previously.34
Páta, like Černý, wrote propaganda for the Lusatian cause. His 1919 history of
Lusatia included an 18-page summary of Sorbian agitation since the war’s end, help-
fully providing a Czech translation of the Narodny Wubjerk’s declaration of inde-
pendence. Páta argued that
[…] it would be completely justified if Prague’s ‘Czecho-Lusatian Society of Adolf Černý’
called for Lusatia to be attached to the Czechoslovak state, and if this annexation is not possi-
ble, then the Peace Conference should recognized Lusatia’s independence, occupy the
Lusatian-Sorbian region with Entente troops, protect Lusatian interests and enable free
exchange between Lusatians and the Czechoslovak Republic.35
Páta dared not hope for a Czechoslovak Lusatia: “It’s a pity that it will not be pos-
sible to reclaim Lusatia, since this would truly save Sorbian national life.” 36
Nevertheless, his reasoning led instead to the optimistic conclusion that “Lusatian
Sorbian independence is really possible!” 37
In 1919, Páta actively promoted the Czecho-Lusatian alliance out of the public
eye. He helped arrange transportation for Sorbian leaders traveling from Bautzen to
Paris.38 On behalf of the Czecho-Lusatian Society, he also wrote several letters to
32 Ibid. 109.
33 Páta: Vznik a vývoj našeho spolku 32-33 (cf. fn. 22).
34 Słowjanska [Slavic Affairs]. In: Katolski Posoł 57 (5 April 1919) no. 14, 85.
35 Páta, Josef: Lužice [Lusatia]. Praha 1919, 73 (cf. fn. 13).
36 Ibid. 78.
37 Ibid. 77.
38 Archiv Ministerstva zahraničních věcí, Pařížský Archiv [Archive of the Ministry of Foreign
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Czechoslovak diplomats at the Peace Conference.39 On 2 February 1919, for exam-
ple, he wrote Beneš on calling for “an independent Lusatian state, uniting Upper and
Lower Lusatia.” 40 Another letter to Beneš urged the Conference “to support the
self-emancipation efforts of our nearest Slavic brothers – the Lusatian Sorbs.” 41
The Czech exile politicians who had won diplomatic recognition for Czecho-
slovakia during the war also took an interest in Lusatia. The Československá národ-
ní rada (Czechoslovak National Council) opened offices in several Entente cities
during the war. In March 1915, Jiří Klecanda, secretary of its Kiev office, wrote a
memorandum that Miloslav Brouček characterized as “the first clearly formulated
program for an independent Czechoslovak state.” 42 Klecanda hoped, among other
things, “to remove Lusatia from Prussia, and attach it to Saxony, and then to create
an autonomous status for Lusatia.” 43 In June that same year, “La Nation Tchèque”,
a Francophone propaganda journal edited by Beneš, published an article on “The
Czecho-Slovaks” which gave the nation’s total population as 8 million (4 million in
Bohemia, and 2 million each in Moravia and Slovakia), but then added an addition-
al half-million for “the Czechs of Silesia, Lusatia, and Southern Austria.” 44
Masaryk, Czechoslovakia’s most prominent exile politician, had taken a scholarly
interest in Lusatia as early as 1876, during a visit to Leipzig,45 but made only what
David Kelly calls “fleeting references to the Sorbs in his wartime propaganda
tracts.” 46 Masaryk may have wished, in the words of Karel Stloukal, “to save the
remnant of the Lusatians from Germanization and push the Czech defensive front
closer to Berlin,” 47 but he did not choose to make it a high priority. During the war
he concentrated primarily on Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia. Speaking at the Uni-
versity of London in 1915, for example, he described Lusatian Sorbs only as one of
many “nationalities” living in Germany.48 In 1917, he published an article in
Affairs, Paris Archive, hereafter AMZV PA], book 51, no. 5074. Josef Páta, letter of 9 March
1919. 
39 In addition to the letters cited below, Páta wrote to the peace conference on 3 January and
18 April. See AMZV PA, book 51, no. 5079, 5081.
40 AMZV PA, book 51, no. 5073. Letter from Páta to “Pane Ministře” [Mr. Minister] (pre-
sumably Beneš), 2 February 1919.  On Beneš’s correspondence, see Hadler, Frank: “Peace-
making 1919 im Spiegel der Briefe Edvard Beneš’ von der Pariser Friedenskonferenz.” In:
Berliner Jahrbuch für Osteuropäische Geschichte (1994) 1, 213-255 und (1994) 2, 225-257.
41 AMZV PA, book 51, no. 5078. Letter from Páta to Beneš, no date.
42 Brouček, Miloslav: Československo [Czechoslovakia]. Praha 1965, 15.
43 See Kelly, David: Lost Provinces: Czechs, Sorbs, and the Problem of Lusatia. In: Journal of
Slavic Military Studies 14 (November 2001) 3, 13-30, 18. – Zmeškal, Vladimir: T. G. Ma-
saryk a Lužice [T. G. Masaryk and Lusatia]. Praha 1930, 12.
44 Les Tchèco-Slovaques. In: La Nation Tchèque 1 (1 June 1915) no. 3, 69.
45 Masaryk, T. G./Čapek, Karel: Hovory s T. G. Masarykem. Praha 1947, 69-70; English
translation “Talks with T. G. Masaryk”, North Haven 1995, 111-112.
46 Kelly: Czechs, Sorbs, and the Problem of Lusatia 20 (cf. fn. 43). Kelly cites Zmeškal,
Vladimir: T. G. Masaryk a Lužice [T. G. Masaryk and Lusatia]. Praha 1930, 11-13.
47 Stloukal, Karel: Československý stát v představách T. G. Masaryka za války [The Czecho-
slovak State as T. G. Masaryk imagined it during the War]. Praha 1930, 30.
48 Cited from a French translation, “Problème des petites nations dans la crise Européenne
actuelle”. In: La Nation Tchèque 1 (1 November 1915) no. 13, 199-205, here 200.
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Chicago’s “Bohemian Review” contrasting “the Czech minorities in Lower Austria
and Vienna” with “the large Sorb minority in Lusatia. Pangermans cannot, therefore,
justly complain of the fate of the [German] minority in Bohemia.” 49 In a November
1918 letter to Beneš, Masaryk made the same point more explicitly: “We leave them
the Sorbs, ergo, they leave us the Germans.” 50 Arriving in Paris on 8 December,
Masaryk outlined Czechoslovak territorial aspirations as follows: “as regards the
question of our frontiers,” he told the London “Times”, “our programme is the old
Czech one of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. As to Slovakia, its limits are clearly
defined in the north and northwest. To the south the solution depends on ethno-
graphical circumstances.” 51 He made no reference to Lusatia.
Nevertheless, Masaryk toyed with the idea of a Czechoslovak Lusatia at least
once. In 1916, meeting with the Russian ambassador in Rome, Masaryk argued that
his plans for Czechoslovak independence “are not directed only by ethnography,”
and demanded instead “historic and strategic frontiers.” 52 Masaryk then drew by
hand a map of Czechoslovakia’s future borders, showing Lusatia as a “possible”
acquisition. Masaryk shaded the core Czechoslovak territory with diagonal lines. He
cross-hatched a narrow strip along what is now the Austrian federal state Burgen-
land, on the modern frontier between Austria and Hungary; the Burgenland corri-
dor was meant to give Czechoslovakia a land border with Yugoslavia.53 Finally,
Masaryk colored solid black various additional territories as secondary ambitions,
including Kłodzko (Glatz) to the north-east, Valtice (Feldsberg) along the southern
frontier with Austria, and Lusatia.54 (See Fig. 1)
Some Czech politicians who spent the war in Bohemia also advocated a Czecho-
slovak Lusatia, but did so in a similarly diffident and irresolute fashion. Consider
František Sís, a Young Czech journalist who later edited the noted paper “Národní
listy”, and Jaroslav Kvapil, the director of the Czech national theatre who later
served briefly in the Ministry of Education and National Enlightenment.55 On 15
49 Masaryk, T. G.: The Future Status of Bohemia. In: Bohemian Review (later Czechoslovak
Review) 1 (April 1917) no. 3, 7.
50 Letter from Masaryk to Beneš, New York City (7 November 1918), cited from: Šolle,
Zdeněk (ed.): Masaryk a Beneš [Masaryk and Beneš]. Vol. 2. Praha 1993, 134.
51 The Slav Barrier: Professor Masaryk Sketches his Policy. In: Times (9 December 1918) 7.
52 Stloukal: Československý stát vpředstavách T. G. Masaryka 85 (cf. fn. 48); English text cited
from Krejčí, Oskar: Geopolitics of the Central European Region. Bratislava 2005, 239.
53 On the corridor, see Romsics, Ignác: Szláv korridor, Burgenland, Lajtabánság: koncepciók
Nyugat-Magyarországról, 1917-1921 [The Slavic Corridor, Burgenland, Leithenia: Con-
ception of Western Hungary]. In: Regio 3 (1992) no. 1, 90-99.
54 Pánek, Jaroslav/Tůma, Oldřich: A History of the Czech Lands. Prague 2009, 33. – For 
a copy of the map, see Ádám, Magda: Csehszlovákia megalakulása [The Founding of
Czechoslovakia]. In: História (1982) no. 4-5, 44-46.
55 On Sís, see Orzoff, Andrea: The Literary Organ of Politics: Tomáš Masaryk and Political
Journalism, 1925-1929. In: Slavic Review 63 (Summer 2004) no. 2, 275-300, here 293-294. –
J. F.: František Sís: Ideje a význam jeho politické práce [František Sís: The Ideas and
Significance of his Political Work]. Olomouc n.d. – On Kvapil, see Kárník, Zdeněk: České
země v éře První republiky 1918-1938 [The Czech lands in the Era of the First Republic,
1918-1938]. Vol. 3: O přežití a o život [On Survival and Life]. Praha 2003, 328.
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Figure 1: Masaryk’s Territorial Aspirations (1916).
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May 1919, Sís and Kvapil, then serving in the Czechoslovak provisional government,
jointly called for Lusatian independence. They invoked both historical precedent
and the rhetoric of national self-determination:
Lusatia had been integrated into the Czech state three centuries ago and had only been
detached because of the Battle of White Mountain. Since then, the Czech and Lusatian nation
[národ lužického a českého] have had firm and sincere relations, particularly from the begin-
ning of the national revival and continuing up to the present. 
After making their case for Czechoslovak Lusatia, however, Sís and Kvapil wavered.
Since the Czech nation had achieved its independence, it should ensure that its
“Slavic guard to the north which had most suffered from Germanization” could
exercise national self-determination. “One of the war’s ideological aims was the lib-
eration of small nations,” they wrote, and the Sorbs, “200000 Slavic souls,” waited
for “the word of liberation from the peace conference.” 56 On the same day, Kvapil
and Sís also wrote directly to Beneš at the peace conference urging him not to forget
the plight of Lusatian Sorbs.57
Karel Kramář, member of the Austrian Reichsrat since 1891 and probably the
most prominent Czech politician to spend the war in Bohemia, took a particularly
strong interest in Lusatia. Nevertheless, his true sympathies lay with Slavdom.
Kramář had served as president of the 1908 Slavic Congress in Prague, married a
Muscovite divorcée, and frequently traveled to Russia.58 In May 1914, on the eve of
war, Kramář composed a draft constitution for a federal “Slavic Empire,” uniting the
Russian Empire with Polish, Czech, and Bulgarian tsardoms (carství), and the
Serbian and Montenegrin kingdoms (království).59 He presented his plan to Russian
journalist Vsevolod Svatkovski, who in turn passed it to Sergej Sazanov, Russian for-
eign minister, a man with little sympathy for Pan-Slav daydreams.60 Kramář never-
theless believed so strongly in Russia that, when the war began, he remained in
Prague hoping “to greet Russian forces upon their arrival.” 61 The Habsburg gov-
ernment proved unable to tolerate such open disloyalty, arrested Kramář alongside
fellow parliamentarian Václav Klofáč and economist Alois Rašín, and ultimately sen-
tenced him to death.62 Kramář’s life was spared only because of dynastic chance.
56 Zasedání Národního shromáždění československého roku 1919 [The National Assembly of
Czechoslovakia in 1919], Tisk 1002, (15 May 1919), URL: http://www.psp.cz/cgi-bin/
eng/eknih/1918ns/ps/tisky/t1002_00.htm> (accessed 29 February 2012).
57 AMZV PA, book 51, document 5064. Letter to Beneš, 15 May 1919. 
58 On the relationship between Kramář and Khulodova-Abriskova, see Čechurová, Jana/
Stehlíková, Dana/Vandrovcová, Miroslava: Karel a Naděžda Kramářovi doma [Karel and
Naděžda Kramář at Home]. Praha 2007, 33-66.
59 Paulová, Milada: Dějiny Maffie: Odboj Čechů a Jihoslovanů za světové války 1914-1918
[The History of the Maffie: The Resistance of Czechs and Yugoslavs in the World War
1914-1918]. Vol. 1 Praha 1937, 638. – Winkler, Martina. Karel Kramář (1860-1937): Selbst-
bild, Fremdwahrnehmungen und Modernisierungsverständnis eines tschechischen Politi-
kers. München 2002, 210.
60 Meškank: Kultur besteht – Reich vergeht 22 (cf. fn. 30).
61 Maohney, William: The History of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Santa Barbara 2011,
133.
62 Soukup, František: 28. říjen 1918 [The 28th of October 1918]. Vol. 1, Praha 1928, 169-184.
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Presented with Kramář’s death warrant on 20 November 1916, the dying Emperor
Franz-Joseph was too ill to sign his name, and died the following day. The Emperor
Karl, upon his accession, commuted the death sentences to lengthy prison terms.63
Kramář ultimately became Czechoslovakia’s first Prime Minister.64
Kramář’s Slavic Empire foresaw a Czechoslovak Lusatia. The Czech tsardom
within his Slavic Empire was to include “Lusatian-Sorbian land in Eastern Saxony
and adjacent Prussian districts to the north.” 65 In 1915, Kramář and Rašín further
imagined the future Czechoslovakia encompassing not only Bohemia, Moravia, and
Slovakia, but also Prussian Silesia (now in Poland), the Burgenland corridor to
Yugoslavia, and Lusatia.66 Josef Novotný described the Kramář-Rašín border 
proposals as the “maximal program”; 67 its frontiers, as Perman observed, extended
“almost to Berlin.” 68 Kramář wanted to claim the historic Bohemian Crown Lands
in their entirety: his declaration of Czechoslovak independence invoked “our his-
toric rights” and promised that “we will never allow our Czech lands to be ripped
asunder.” 69
That said, Kramář’s dedication to a Czechoslovak Lusatia should not be over-stat-
ed. As a member of the Czechoslovak delegation to the Paris Peace Conference,
Kramář merely proposed various “rectifications of the historic German-Bohemian
boundary.” 70 In practice, however, other questions dominated his attention. In a
lengthy letter to Beneš on 15 November 1918, Kramář discussed the future Czecho-
slovakia’s border disputes at length without mentioning Lusatia.71 A similar letter
from 6 April 1919 discussed Těšín/Cieszyn, a free trade zone in Hamburg, the inter-
nationalization of river traffic on the Elbe and the Oder rivers, and the Yugoslav cor-
ridor.72 As 1919 unfolded, furthermore, Kramář became increasingly preoccupied
with the Russian civil war, and began, in Martina Lustigová’s words, “to dream of
himself as the great liberator of Russia.” 73 Indeed, in a letter to Masaryk on 6 April
63 Hlaváč, Miroslav: Čestí Mafiáni 1914-1918 [The Czech Mafia 1914-1918]. Praha 2008, 38.
64 Bradley, John: Czechoslovakia: External Crisis and Internal Compromise. In: Berg-Schlos-
ser, Dirk/Mitchell, Jeremy (eds.): Conditions of Democracy in Europe, 1919-1939: Syste-
matic Case Studies. London 2000, 85-105, here 87-89. 
65 Paulová: Dějiny Maffie, vol. 1, 638-638 (cf. fn. 59). For the complete Slavonic constitution
see 635-640. – See also Hlaváč: Čestí Mafiáni 33-42 (cf. fn. 63).
66 Novotný: Vzkříšení samostatnosti československé. Kronika let 1914-1918 [The Res-
surection of Czechoslovak Independence. Chronicle of the Years 1914-1918]. Vol. 1, Praha
1932, 601, see map on p. 554. – See also Perman, Dagmar: The Shaping of the Czechoslovak
State. Diplomatic History of the Boundaries of Czechoslovkia, 1914-1920. Leiden 1962, 23. 
67 Novotný: Vzkříšení samostatnosti československé, vol. 1, 601 (cf. fn. 66).
68 Perman: The Shaping of the Czechoslovak State 23 (cf. fn. 66)
69 Die Proklamierung der tschechischen Republik. In: Pilsner Tagblatt (15 November 1918) 2.
70 Perman: The Shaping of the Czechoslovak State 127 (cf. fn. 66).
71 “Document 12,” letter from Kramář to Beneš (5 December 1918). In: Dejmek, Jindřich/
Kolář, František (eds.): Československo na pařížské mírové konferenci 1918-1920 [Czecho-
slovakia at the Paris Peace Conference 1918-1920]. Vol. 1. Praha 2001, 68-72.
72 “Letter 215,” Kramář to Masaryk, 6 April 1919, cited from: Hlavačka, Milan/Kárník,
Zdeněk (eds.): Korespondence T. G. Masaryk – Karel Kramář [The Correspondence of T.
G. Masaryk and Karel Kramář]. Praha 2005, 346.
73 Lustigová, Martina: Karel Kramář. Praha 2007, 168.
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he argued primarily for Czechoslovak intervention in Russia: “we must have a dem-
ocratic Slavic federation, else we are simply lost.” 74 Masaryk remained unpersuaded;
as early as 19 February, he had complained confidentially to Beneš that Kramář “has
fantasies of Russia and nothing else interests him.” 75 Kramář’s growing obsession
with Russia meant that he neglected Lusatia and the Sorbs during his sojourn in
Paris.
Kramář’s greatest service to the Lusatian cause was to get Adolf Černý appointed
as Lusatian specialist for the Czechoslovak delegation at the Peace Conference. On
22 November 1918, Černý officially joined the department for geographic, ethno-
graphic, and statistical questions, which Zděnek Vácha characterized as “the most
important” of the expert committees.76 The Sorbian national council in Bautzen, fur-
thermore, granted Černý plenipotenary powers to represent Lusatia at the Paris
Peace Conference.77 Černý was not idle during his time in Paris: he composed a flur-
ry of memoranda about the Lusatian question. A letter of 26 December described
the Sorbs as “a distinct Slavic nation,” yet called for a Czech protectorate over
Lower and Upper Lusatia. He also demanded the release of Sorbian prisoners,
attaching the Narodny Wubjerk’s appeal to the prisoners themselves.78 In January, he
wrote several documents describing German attempts to obstruct the Lusatian
movement.79 Černý also composed a booklet on Lusatian history whose narrative,
beginning in the Middle Ages, emphasized “Germanization” and “denationaliza-
tion,” and concluded that “the Peace Conference should ensure that the Lusatian-
Sorbian ethnographic territory forms an independent state entity, connected to the
Czechoslovak state.” 80 Černý’s dedication to Lusatia was exceptional; the Sorbian
leadership rightly saw in him a tenacious and stalwart ally.
When the Czechoslovak specialists arrived in Paris, Beneš charged them with pro-
ducing documents and maps to bolster Czechoslovak claims. His instructions of 15
January 1919 specifically called for a map of Lusatia and four memoranda on the
Lusatian question. One would consider Lusatia as a “strategic problem,” another its
74 “Letter 215,” Kramář to Masaryk, 6 April 1919, cited from: Hlavačka/Kárník (eds.):
Korespondence 346-347 (cf. fn. 72).
75 Masaryk to Beneš, 19 February 1919, cited from Lustigová: Karel Kramář 168 (cf. fn. 73).
76 Vácha, Zděnek: Žádám vás jako vynikajícího odborníka … Organizace odborných prací
pro československou delagaci na mírové konferenci v Paříží v letech 1918-1919 [I ask you
as an Outstanding Expert … The Organization of Experts for the Czechoslovak Delegation
at the Peace Conference in Paris in the Years 1918-1919]. Praha 2012, 119, 71. Vácha also
provides a photograph of Černý’s credentials, see pp. 238, 302-04. Originals in Masarykův
ústav a Archiv Adademie České Republiky [Masaryk Foundation and the Archive of the
Academy of the Czech Republic], f. [fund] Černý, Adolf. 
77 AMZV PA, book 51, document 5083. “Wulcysławnemu čěskosłowenskemu Narodnemu
Wubjerkej w Prazy” [On the Czechoslovak Accreditation of the National Council in
Paris]. 
78 AMZV PA, book 51, no. 5034. Letter from Černý to Beneš (26 December 1918).
79 MAZV, Pařížský Archiv, book 51 respectively documents 5045 and 5047. Černý, Adolf:
Německý hlasy o lužické otázce [German Voices on the Lusatian Question] (27 January
1919). – “Němci a lužická otázka II [The Germans and the Lusatian Question II]. 
80 MAZV Pařížský Archiv, book 51, no. 5048. Černý: Lužice 3, 4, 11 (cf. fn. 28). 
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economic situation “in the case of liberation and unification with Bohemia,” a third
its railway connections to Bohemia, and the fourth its demographic character, esti-
mating the German population in both a “maximum and minimum program.” 81
Černý, still in Prague, did not contribute to the initial discussions that Czechoslovak
specialists held on Czechoslovakia’s borders.82 Nevertheless, Czechoslovak officer
Rudolf Kalhous, for example, wrote a report on “the borders of the Czechoslovak
state from a strategic point of view,” concluding that a Czechoslovak Lusatia would
offer some “protection against a German attack on the northern front.” Kalhous also
noted that a Czechoslovak Lusatia would “cut or at least hinder communications
between Saxony and Upper Silesia,” and also “improve the Czechoslovak strategic
position at least in the first days of mobilization.” 83 The Czechoslovak delegation
thus worked for a Czechoslovak Lusatia even in Černý’s absence. 
When Černý finally arrived in Paris on 24 February, he devoted his time almost
exclusively to Lusatia. Indeed, of the 25 members of the Czechoslovak delegation,
Černý proved the third most prolific, publishing 41 different works while the con-
ference was in session.84 He prepared newspaper editorials in Czech, Sorbian, and
French.85 Černý also served as liaison between the Czechoslovak leadership and the
Serbski Narodny Wubjerk, in other words, between Beneš and Bart.86 Bart, mean-
while, had attached himself to the Czechoslovak delegation. He received logistical
support, though apparently not the daily allowance paid to other Czechoslovak
experts.87
In general, however, Czech enthusiasm for Lusatia generally remained confined
within certain limits. The same Jaroslav Kvapil who wrote to Beneš about the
Lusatian question in April 1919 had, for example, explicitly renounced Lusatia less
than a year previously. Kvapil’s “Manifesto of the Czech intellectuals” of May 1917
provoked German accusations of hypocrisy, since Kvapil declared Bohemia’s his-
toric frontiers inviolable while simultaneously claiming Slovakia from Hungary on
ethnographic grounds.88 In a rebuttal, Kvapil argued that that there was “only an
apparent contradiction.” He declared the modesty of Czech demands by somewhat
inaccurately suggesting that “it would not occur to anybody in today’s Bohemia to
reclaim Prussian Silesia and Lusatia, even though both regions were part of the
81 “Document 71,” Beneš’s instructions of 15 January, in Dejmek/Kolář: Československo na
pařížské mírové konferenci 159 (cf. fn. 71).
82 Vácha: Organizace odborných prací 104 (cf. fn. 76).
83 Kalhous, Rudolf: Hranice československého státu ze stanoviska strategických [The Fron-
tiers of the Czechoslovak State from a Strategic Perspective]. In: Dejmek/Kolář:
Československo na pařížské mírové konferenci 174 (cf. fn. 71).
84 Vácha: Organizace odborných prací 248, 38, 166 (cf. fn. 76).
85 Ibid. 184.
86 Ibid. 168.
87 Ibid. 228. – On Bart’s activities in Paris, see Remes, Friedrich: Die Sorbenfrage 1918/1919:
Untersuchung einer gescheiterten Autonomiebewegung. Bautzen 1993, 160-170.
88 Berman, Richard: Brief an Jaroslav Kvapil. In: Der Friede 1 (1918) no. 5, 101-102; cited
from Ifkovitz, Kurt (ed.): Hermann Bahr – Jaroslav Kvapil. Briefe, Texte, Dokumente. Bern
2007 (Wechselwirkungen 11) 629-633.
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Bohemian state for centuries.” Kvapil had concluded that Czech aspirations to
Lusatia “would be laughable, unwise, and even immoral.” 89 
Czech popular cartography also showed little interest in Lusatia. In late Novem-
ber 1918, Prague bookstores began selling maps of the future Czechoslovak state,
anticipating what future frontiers the Entente might determine. The maps, as de-
scribed in the “Prager Tagblatt”, claimed some territory from the German Empire:
they shifted the Bohemian frontier north into Silesia, claiming Kłodzko, Kamienna
Góra (Landeshut), and Szklarska Poręba (Schreiberhau), all now in Poland. The
bookstore maps did not, however, extend the Czechoslovak frontier to Lusatia.90
Not all Czech patriots, it seems, dreamed of a Czechoslovak Lusatia.
Yet while the notion of a Czechoslovak Lusatia failed to inspire universal enthu-
siasm, a vacillating yet persistent desire for a Czechoslovak Lusatia persevered in
both the public sphere and in official circles. Influential figures, including Klecanda,
Sís, Kvapil, Kramář, Rašín, and Masaryk, all took some interest in Lusatia. At the
same time, however, Lusatia remained a secondary objective, a lesser priority which
might be tactically abandoned, or even traded away as a bargaining chip. 
When Beneš actually presented Czechoslovak demands to the Entente, however,
he made a restrained case for Czechoslovak annexation. On 5 February 1919, Beneš
spoke to Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando for three and a half
hours. As Czechoslovakia’s second representative to the Peace Conference, Kramář
also attended, but Beneš did all the talking. Charles Seymour, a Yale historian and
chief of the American committee on Austro-Hungarian questions, wrote that
[...] poor Kramářz [sic], who wanted to speak, was not allowed to. When he asked for half an
hour, Clemenceau said “O, we’ll appoint a special commission and you can talk to them for a
couple of hours. Now we had better have a cup of tea.”91
Seymour’s British colleague Harold Nicolson found Clemenceau’s rudeness 
embarrassing, and also observed Kramář’s “indignation at being treated as of no
importance.” 92
Beneš probably sought to dominate the meeting because he feared Kramář might
say something rash; he succeeded because he then enjoyed the general esteem of
Entente diplomats. Clemenceau recalled Beneš as “one of the best of them all,” as a
man “who won general esteem and confidence by the high rectitude of his speech
and by his lofty intellect.” 93 Seymour, who lunched with Beneš and Kramář just
before the 5 February meeting, thought Beneš “a delightful little chap, just as friend-
89 Kvapil, Jaroslav: Eine Antwort. In: Der Friede 1 (1918) no. 6, 178-79, cited from Ifkovitz
(ed.): Hermann Bahr – Jaroslav Kvapil 638 (cf. fn. 88).
90 Die Grenzen des neuen tschecho-slowakischen Staates. In: Prager Tagblatt (23 November
1918) 2. – Tschechische Ansprüche auf Teile Preußisch-Schlesiens. In: Fremden-Blatt (4
December 1918) 3. 
91 Letter of Sunday, February 8, 1919. In: Whiteman, Harold (ed.): Letters from the Paris
Peace Conference by Charles Seymour. New Haven 1965, 155-156. – Clemenceau after-
ward complained to Kramář: “But he was very long, your Beneš!” See Nicolson, Harold:
Peacemaking, 1919. London 1943 [1933] 258. 
92 Ibid. 210.
93 Clemenceau, Georges: Grandeur and Misery of Victory. London 1930, 140.
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ly and as moderate as one could wish,” wondering only “whether he will be able to
last, because he is caught at home between the extreme chauvinists who want to grab
everything in sight.” 94 Seymour did not list any “extreme chauvinists” by name, but
Nicholson thought that Czechs who “had remained in Prague during the whole
war,” such as Kramář, “thought only in terms of extreme Czech nationalism.”
Nicholson also professed his personal “dislike of Kramarsh [sic], who is behind
everything nasty that Benes does.” 95 Kramář may have aroused some pity since he
was still recovering from a botched assassination on 11 January,96 but Entente diplo-
mats probably prevented him from speaking on 5 February at least in part from per-
sonal dislike.
Beneš’s audience was sympathetic. The Czechoslovak Legion’s adventures in re-
volutionary Russia had captured the public imagination: former American president
Theodore Roosevelt, for example, donated a thousand dollars from his Nobel Peace
Prize to “the Czechoslovaks, the extraordinary nation of whose great and heroic feat
is literally unparalleled, so far as I know, in ancient or modern warfare.” 97 The pres-
ence of an organized army inside Russia also gave the Czechoslovaks unexpected
political leverage when the Entente decided to intervene in the Russian Civil War on
the side of the Whites.98 Should Germany decide not to sign the treaty, furthermore,
the Entente counted on Czech forces to break German resistance. When the Council
of Four pondered possible military action on 16 June, for example, Clemencau sug-
gested that the Entente seek “junction with the Czech army, which has ten divisions
of first-rate soldiers. It lacks matériel; we will give it to them.” 99 The Entente, anx-
ious to maintain good relations with the Czechoslovaks, treated them with indul-
gence. When Beneš, in response to American concerns about Czechoslovakia’s large
German minority, offered to cede predominantly German territories near Cheb
(Eger) and Frydlant (Friedland), the French, British, and Italian delegates urged the
Czechoslovaks to remain firm.100 Australian delegate Joseph Cook frankly advocat-
ed a policy of letting “our friends the Czechs have what they want.” 101
Given this uniquely favorable opportunity to articulate Czechoslovakia’s ambi-
tions, Beneš conspicuously refrained from claiming Lusatia directly. According to
94 Letter of Sunday, February 8, 1919. In Whiteman: Letters from the Paris Peace Conference
155 (cf. fn. 91).
95 Nicolson: Peacemaking, 1919, 266 (cf. fn. 91).
96 On the attempted assassination, see Borovička, Václav Pavel: Vražda měšťáckého revolu-
cionáře. Atentáty, které měly změnit svět [The Murder of a Bourgeoise Revolutionary:
Assassinations which have Changed the World]. Praha 2007, 192-195.
97 Mamatey, Victor S.: The United States and East-Central Europe, 1914-1918. A Study in
Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda. Princeton 1957, 301.
98 Kennan, George: Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920. Vol. 2: The Decision to Intervene.
Princeton 1989, 144-149. – Kalvoda, Josef: Masaryk in America in 1918. In: Jahrbücher für
die Geschichte Osteuropas 27 (1979) no. 1, 85-99, here particularly 90-99.
99 Mantoux, Paul: The Deliberations of the Council of Four (March 24-June 28, 1919. Vol. 1.
Princeton 1992, 465.
100 Wandycz, Piotr: France and Her Eastern Allies, 1919-1925: French-Czechoslovak-Polish
Relations from the Paris Peace Conference in Locarno. Minneapolis 1962, 58.
101 Seymour, Charles: Czechoslovak Frontiers. In: The Yale Review 28 (December 1938) 273-
291, here 277, 284.
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the American diplomatic record of his remarks, Beneš asserted that “the Czechs
made no claim on this subject, and even thought it might be dangerous for them to
undertake this mission.” 102 Beneš then made a legal case for a Czechoslovak Lusatia,
noting accurately that “the country had once belonged to Bohemia” and describing
its location as “only 6 kilometers from the Bohemian frontier.” He implied that
Lusatia’s German history was brief and transient, falsely claiming that “it had
become German only in 1867.” 103 He argued that the Sorbs themselves “desire to be
autonomous under Czech protection.” Should the Entente press Czechoslovakia to
annex Lusatia, Beneš implied, Czechoslovak leaders would reluctantly acquiesce.
After making both legal and ethnographic arguments for a Czechoslovak Lusatia,
however, Beneš concluded by claiming that he raised the Sorbian question as “a
moral rather than a political matter.” The Sorbs, he said, “were nearest to the Czechs,
and had begged him to present their problem to the Conference.” In his capacity as
Czechoslovak representative, however, Beneš merely asked the Entente to “examine
the problem.” 104
Why did Beneš play so coy? By abstaining from claiming Lusatia directly, he pre-
sented himself as moderate and reasonable, which proved effective psychology.
While the Great Powers liked to pose as liberators in the former Habsburg Empire,
they also found that, “policies of ‘self-determination,’ ‘independence’ and related
ideas,” had kindled, in the words of Herbert Hoover,
[...] a fire of extreme nationalism in the newly created states of Eastern Europe, fully evident at
the Peace conference by exaggerated demands for territory based not only on racial justifica-
tions but on economic or defense motives, and sometimes also on purely historical boundaries
of the dim past.105
Hoover’s words accurately characterize the Czechoslovak position, yet Beneš suc-
cessfully posed as a moderate exception to the rule of East European extremism, and
thus a good partner for the Entente. Unlike other suppliants, Beneš was happy to
promise equal treatment for future minorities within Czechoslovakia.106 Where 
others were passionate and outspoken, Beneš depicted himself as moderate and con-
ciliatory. 
Beneš reaped concrete rewards from his moderate reputation. In June 1919, when
the Entente officially notified the Czech and Romanian delegations of Central
Europe’s new borders, Beneš found himself in a position similar to that of Romania’s
102 Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation. In: Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris
Peace Conference. Vol. 3. Washington 1942, 886.
103 If the American notes are accurate, the reference to 1867 suggests that Beneš adopted an
intriguing political strategy. By evoking the relatively recent year of Bismarck’s successful
war against Austria, Beneš implicitly characterized Lusatia, like Bohemia, Moravia, and
Slovakia, as a former territory of the Habsburg Empire. He also raised the specter of
Prussian militarism, perhaps to influence the French commission. It seems unlikely that
Beneš would have made this mistake from ignorance; considered that Černý’s history of
Lusatia correctly gave 1815 as the date of Lusatia’s final partition between Saxony and
Prussia. See Černý: Lužice 11 (cf. fn. 28); MAZV PA, book 51, no. 5048. 
104 Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation 886 (cf. fn. 102).
105 Hoover, Herbert: The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson. Baltimore 1992 [1958] 76.
106 See e.g. Fink, Carole: Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and
International Minority Protection, 1878-1938. Cambridge 2006, 144.
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Prime Minister and conference delegate Ion I.C.Braˇtianu. Yet Braˇtianu, unlike
Beneš, had antagonized Entente diplomats: British diplomat James Headlam-Morley
found him “very difficult,” 107 and Nicholson thought him as “a bearded woman, a
forceful humbug, [...] a most unpleasing man.” 108 Contrasting Beneš and Braˇtianu’s
performance at the negotiating table, Seymour thought “it was interesting to see the
difference.” 
Braˇtianu was very sulky and belligerent in his dissatisfaction with the proposed frontier; said
that he could not possibly accept it without consultation with his people in Bucharest. Beneš,
although he pretended to be bitterly disappointed, was as usual very smiling and said he and
the Czechs would do everything to help. The result was that in today’s meeting of the Five,
the small additions that Beneš asked for were granted; while in answer to Braˇtianu’s complaint
the Five recommended that the suggested frontier be maintained.109
Beneš, perhaps due to his wartime experiences in exile, understood the psychology
of Entente diplomats, and benefitted accordingly.
Indeed, Beneš’s restrained tactics arguably won for Czechoslovakia Transcar-
pathian Ruthenia. Beneš characterized both Lusatia and Ruthenia as questions “not
be considered claims made on behalf of Czecho-Slovakia.” He suggested merely that
the Ruthenes “did not wish to remain under Hungarian control and proposed to
form an autonomous state in close federation with Czecho-Slovakia.” He argued
that “it would be unjust to leave them to the tender mercies of the Magyars” and
concluded that if the Great Powers, in their wisdom, assigned the region to
Czechoslovakia, “this would impose a burden [...] but would afford the advantage of
a common frontier with the Roumanians.” 110 The Entente assigned the territory to
Czechoslovakia.
Beneš asked for the Entente to consider the Lusatian question as a “moral issue.”
To the surprise and delight of Czechoslovak diplomats, the Entente actually agreed
to consider the prospect of a Czechoslovak Lusatia.111 They delegated the question
to the Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs. While Wilson’s apologists would sub-
sequently claim that border questions were be decided by “dispassionate scientists –
geographers, ethnologists, economists,” 112 the experts appointed to the Czecho-
slovak commission were anything but dispassionate. One French expert, the histo-
rian Ernest Denis, had spent much of the war publishing the francophone propa-
ganda journal “La Nation Tchèque” with Beneš himself! 113
107 Headlam-Morley, James: A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference. London 1971, 19.
108 Nicholson: Peacemaking, 1919, 202 (cf. fn. 91).
109 Letter of Wednesday, June 12, 1919. In Whiteman: Letters from the Paris Peace Conference
268 (cf. fn. 91).
110 Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation 886 (cf. fn. 102).
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112 Baker, Ray: Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement Vol. 1. London 1923, 112; for Entente
discussions of specialists, see 186-188.
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The Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs nevertheless rejected a Czechoslovak
Lusatia. Leading British expert R. W. Seton-Watson, Masaryk’s personal friend, con-
sidered a Czechoslovak Lusatia “quite impracticable,” concluding that the Sorbs
“should be assured a local autonomy of their own within the German Federal Re-
public, and that they should all be [...] no longer partitioned between Saxony and
Prussian Silesia.” 114 Nicholson less diplomatically declared the idea “mere rub-
bish.” 115 The French commissioners, the most strongly Germanophobe and perhaps
therefore the most strongly Czechophile, also opposed a Czechoslovak Lusatia; 116
their final report concluded “it is impossible to consider the solution of this question
by any territorial adjustment.” 117 The Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs pro-
posed only minor adjustments to the Czech-German frontier. 
When the committee’s report went before the Council of Four on 4 April, how-
ever, even its minor recommendations found an unsympathetic hearing. Wilson was
absent from the crucial meeting, but Clemenceau articulated the Council’s collective
feeling when discussing the Czech-German frontier with Lloyd-George and
Wilson’s confidant Edward House:
I have just studied the report of the competent commission of experts on the boundary
between Bohemia and Germany. The settlement is very complicated and makes all sorts of
changes, some of which include cessions of territory to the Germans; that seems very useless
to me. The simplest thing is to maintain the border as it was before the war and to leave to
Bohemia and Germany the task of making territorial exchanges between themselves as they
seem appropriate.
Lloyd George replied: “I agree with you that the old frontier between Bohemia and
Germany should be respected.” House concurred: “that solution seems best to me.”
There the discussion ended, pending objections from Wilson.118
As it happened, Wilson objected, so in May the Powers then referred the question
of Lusatia to the Council of Foreign ministers. The Council of Foreign Ministers in
turn referred the question to the Commission on New States, which concluded that
“practical difficulties [...] make any special provision for the Lusatian Slavs impos-
sible.” 119 And so the Peace Conference definitively rejected both a Czechoslovak
Lusatia and an independent Lusatian state.
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Most Czech leaders accepted the loss of Lusatia with resignation. Both Beneš and
Kramář had other priorities. Indeed, as early as 7 March, Beneš had written to the
Czech parliament that “there is not a large chance for success” in the Lusatian ques-
tion.120 Of the Czechoslovak delegation, Černý alone remained active on behalf of
Sorbian interests. When the Treaty of Versailles made no provision for Sorbian in-
dependence or autonomy and Bart began petitioning for Lusatian autonomy within
Germany,121 Černý wrote articles calling for Saxony to acquire Prussian Lusatia, or
alternatively for what Piotr Pałys called a “quasi-plebiscite” over Lusatia’s future
status.122 Nothing came of such arguments: the Sorbian independence movement
utterly failed to achieve any of its aspirations.
Czech desires for a Czechoslovak Lusatia, however lackadaisical, were genuine.
Understanding the decisive negotiations at the Paris Peace conference requires us to
recreate the heady atmosphere of late 1918 and early 1919. The end of the old
empires, experienced as liberation, filled Czech patriots with a sense of boundless
possibility. Wartime Germanophobia, mixed with the swagger of victory, may have
been infectious and intoxicating. In late 1918, therefore, Czech patriots articulated
aspirations that could never have been entertained under the old regime, aspirations
that ultimately went unfulfilled and that, perhaps, seem unwise in retrospect.123
The diplomacy surrounding Lusatia sheds light on Beneš’s moderation as a diplo-
mat, which perhaps deserves emphasis. Lloyd-George’s 1938 memoirs, published as
storm clouds of war gathered over Czechoslovakia, condemned Beneš as a “short-
sighted politician who did not foresee that the more he grasped, the less he could
retain.” 124 Considering how much more influence Lloyd-George had wielded dur-
ing the actual decision-making process than Beneš, such comments speak most loud-
ly to Lloyd-George’s unwillingness to confront his own failings as a peacemaker.
Czechoslovakia’s restrained approach toward Lusatia can be read as a cynical nego-
tiating tactic, but the fact that Beneš readily abandoned hopes for a Czechoslovak
Lusatia suggests that Beneš, whatever his other faults, could resist temptation and
choose his battles. Kramář, at any rate, failed to display such qualities. 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Czechoslovakia’s Lusatian aspirations, how-
ever, concerns the seeming irrelevance of nationalism. Eric Hobsbawm has spoken
of the “overwhelming triumph of the ‘principle of nationality’ in the post-1918 peace
settlements,” 125 yet the nationality principle played little role in resolving the
Lusatian question. The great powers never consulted Lusatia’s inhabitants via
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plebiscite; and more significantly never considered organizing one. The Lusatian
question thus offers more evidence of the gap between Wilsonian rhetoric and diplo-
matic practice. Further evidence of Entente hypocrisy, of course, has long been sur-
plus to requirements; even before the treaty of Versailles was signed, disillusioned
idealists had begun compiling what William Keylor has called “the demonology of
Versailles.” 126 Even neglecting the sordid realities of diplomacy and restricting our
attention solely to the rhetoric of suppliants, however, Czechoslovakia’s Lusatian
diplomacy reveals a surprising lack of nationalist idealism. For Masaryk, Kvapil,
Kramář and Beneš, the historic rights of the Czech crown played a role as large if not
larger than the much-vaunted ideal of national self-determination. While the push
for Czechoslovak Lusatia may at first glance appear a quintessentially Wilsonian
phenomenon, it rested on legal rights and historical precedents which recall pre-
nationalist European diplomatic traditions. 
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